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Dans cet article, nous étendons l’approche traditionnelle de la concurrence ﬁscale horizontale
en endogénéisant le moment des décisions faites par les pays en concurrence. Nous montrons
que les équilibres parfaits en sous-jeux correspondent aux deux équilibres de Stackelberg, ce
qui engendre un problème de coordination. Pour résoudre ce problème, nous considérons une
spéciﬁcation quadratique de la fonction de production, et nous recourrons à deux critères
de sélection d’un équilibre : la risque-dominance et la Pareto-dominance. A l’équilibre ainsi
sélectionné, la moins productive (la plus petite) juridiction mène et renonce à l’avantage de
second-joueur. Nous obtenons ainsi deux autres résultats : (i) la pression à la baisse est
moindre qu’on ne le pense généralement ; (ii) la règle selon laquelle le grand pays ﬁxe un taux
plus élevé ne tient pas toujours.
JEL Codes: H30, H87, C72.
Key-words: concurrence ﬁscale ; équilibre de Stackelberg ; risque-dominance.
1Abstract
In this paper we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endoge-
nizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions. Following the literature
on the endogenous timing in duopoly games, we consider a pre-play stage, where jurisdictions
commit themselves to move early or late, i.e. to ﬁxt h e i rt a xr a t ea taﬁrst or second stage. We
highlight that at least one jurisdiction experiments a second-mover advantage. We show that
the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) correspond to the two Stackelberg situations yielding to
a coordination problem. In order to solve this issue, we consider a quadratic speciﬁcation of the
production function, and we use two criteria of selection: Pareto-dominance and risk-dominance.
We emphasize that at the safer equilibrium the less productive or smaller jurisdiction leads and
hence loses the second-mover advantage. If asymmetry among jurisdictions is suﬃcient, Pareto-
dominance reinforces risk-dominance in selecting the same SPE. Three results may be deduced
from our analysis: (i) the downward pressure on tax rates is less severe than predicted; (ii) the
smaller jurisdiction leads; (iii) the ‘big-country-higher-tax-rate’ rule does not always hold.
JEL Codes: H30, H87, C72.
Key-words: Endogenous timing; tax competition; ﬁrst/second-mover advantage; strategic com-
plements; Stackelberg; Risk dominance.
21 Introduction
Tax competition is often seen as characterized by a downward pressure on tax rates,
leading to under-provision of public goods (dubbed “race to the bottom”). This result has
been obtained using models that formalize tax competition through a Nash equilibrium
with simultaneous moves (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986) or Wildasin
(1988)).1
In this paper, we challenge this result by endogenizing the timing of decisions by
ﬁscal authorities. The assumption of simultaneous moves of countries when deciding their
tax policy, is largely accepted. But, as remarked by Schelling (1960), the viability of
the equilibrium with simultaneous moves is dubious as soon as countries’ commitment is
considered. An obvious way to commit is to decide before the others. Very few articles in
the literature on international tax competition consider the case where tax decisions are
sequential:2 Gordon (1992), Wang (1999) and to a smaller extent Baldwin and Krugman
(2004). The ﬁrst author considers double-taxationc o n v e n t i o n sb e t w e e nc o u n t r i e s .H e
establishes that capital income taxation can be sustained if the dominant capital exporter
country acts as a Stackelberg leader by choosing its tax policy ﬁrst. Following Kanbur
and Keen (1993) who focus on commodity taxation, Wang (1999) assumes that the larger
country behaves as a Stackelberg leader. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) highlight the
role of economies of agglomeration to explain why tax rates remain higher in the core
country than in the periphery, by assuming that the core country moves ﬁrst. In the
empirical literature on tax competition too, few papers deviate from the simultaneous tax
competition assumption (see Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) or Redoano (2007)).
The preceding theoretical works which consider a Stackelberg conﬁguration assume an
exogenous timing, each jurisdiction or country having its predetermined role as leader or
1This approach has been extended in many directions by taking into account the diﬀerence among
countries in their size or their initial endowments, by studying several tax instruments, by considering
Leviathan governments, and so on. See for instance the surveys of Wilson (1999) or Wilson and Wildasin
(2004) among the most recents.
2Several recent papers on ﬁscal federalism consider a Stackelberg game where the central govern-
ment leads. However, the induced vertical tax competition is not encompassed in the deﬁnition of tax
competition by Wilson and Wildasin (2004). Moreover, the sequence of moves is assumed to be given.
3follower.3 Given this background, the aim of this paper is twofold: ﬁrstly, going beyond the
study of the Stackelberg equilibrium, we analyze the endogenous timing of tax setting and
its consequences on the ﬁnal equilibrium, which becomes a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE); secondly, since there are several SPEs, we solve the coordination issue that appears
by using the notions of Pareto and risk dominance. This allows us to identify the leader
respectively at the eﬃcient equilibrium and at the safest one.
Our analysis is grounded on the standard approach to horizontal tax competition
proposed by Wildasin (1988), as formalized by Laussel and Le Breton (1998). This model
presents the advantage of focusing exclusively on strategic interactions. Moreover, Laussel
and Le Breton (1998) rigorously establish the condition of existence and uniqueness of
a Nash equilibrium in the canonical tax competition game.4 Following the literature on
endogenous timing in duopoly games initiated by d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1980)
and Gal-Or (1985), we consider the two-period action commitment game proposed by
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990): each country has to move in one of two periods; if one
player chooses to move early, i.e. to ﬁx its tax rate at the ﬁrst period, while the other
moves late, the latter behaves as a Stackelberg follower, the former as a leader; otherwise,
choices of tax rates are simultaneous, and countries play the standard tax competition
game. This kind of game, which has been called “leadership game” or “commitment
game” has been mainly developped in Industrial Organization.5 Our approach is close to
van Damme and Hurkens (2004) and Amir and Stepanova (2006), who develop models
3For instance, Wang (1999) writes (p. 974):
"It is natural and conceivable that, in a real-world situation of tax-setting, the large region
moves ﬁrst and the small region moves second."
4The issue of equilibrium existence, a fortiori uniqueness, is seldom tackled in the tax competition
literature. Bucovetsky (1991), Wildasin (1991) or Wilson (1991) specify their respective model so as to
have simple (generally linear) best reply curves. More recently, except Laussel and Le Breton (1998),
we can mention the works of Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad (2005), Rothstein (2007) or Petchey and
Shapiro (2009): Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad (2005) use the concept of a second order locally consistent
equilibrium, which is less general than the Nash equilibrium; Rothstein (2007) considers ad valorem taxes
instead of unit taxes; Petchey and Shapiro (2009) develop a dual approach, where countries minimize
their policies’ costs.
5This framework is also used in the international trade literature (Syropoulos (1994), Raimondos-
Møller and Woodland (2000)) and in public economics (Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010), where we
propose a taxonomy of international interactions depending on the sign of the spillovers and the nature
of interactions).
4of endogenous moves in Bertrand duopoly game where ﬁrms’ strategies, i.e. prices, are
complements.
We consider three “basic games” depending on the sequence of moves: one static
and two Stackelberg games. In these games inspired from Wildasin (1988) and Laussel
and Le Breton (1998), tax rates are strategic complements.6 This property has been
widely documented in empirical works on countries’ reaction functions (see Devereux,
Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) for instance). Morever, besides its realism, this property
involves the supermodularity of the standard tax competition game, which insures the
existence of equilibria. We rank the equilibrium tax rates obtained for the three basic
games, and show that the standard tax competition equilibrium (simultaneous moves)
leads to the lowest rates. We highlight a second-mover advantage for at least one of the
two countries, which is consistent with the strategic complementarity of the tax rates.
We turn into the timing game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The Subgame
Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) correspond to the two Stackelberg situations. These equilibrium
tax rates are unambiguously superior to these determined in the simultaneous Nash game.
The downward pressure on tax rates is less strong than predicted in the standard tax
competition analysis.
Since we obtain two SPEs, a new issue appears which concerns the coordination among
equilibria: which country chooses to move ﬁrst? To answer, we determine the conditions
under which Pareto (or payoﬀ) dominance of one SPE is garanteed. However, this criterion
fails to apply for all possible situations. It requires suﬃcient asymmetry among countries.
Beyond the Pareto criterion, we consider the notion of risk-dominance as deﬁned by
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) to establish which equilibrium is the more secure.7 Both the
Pareto- and risk-dominance criteria support the view that the smaller (less productive)
country leads the tax competition, thus losing the “second-mover advantage”. In other
words, leading the competition does not translate into a “small country” advantage (see
6Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) coined the terms “strategic substitutes” and “strategic
complements” to deﬁne the cases of downward- and upward-sloping reaction functions, respectively.
7We consider quadratic production functions usually used in the literature, because the use of the
risk-dominance criterion requires the speciﬁcation of the payoﬀ functions.
5Wellisch (2000)). Indeed, we establish that the “big-country-higher-tax-rate” rule does
not always hold, that is the smaller country may ﬁxa nh i g h e rt a xr a t e .O u rﬁndings are
direct implications of the existing strategic complementarity in the tax competition race.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the basic framework
and the three simple games depending on the simultaneity or sequentiality of country’s
moves; in section 3,w ed e t e r m i n et h eS P E sb yr a n k i n gt h et a xr a t e si nt h ed i ﬀerent
games, highlighting a second-mover advantage in the extended game, and solving this;
in section 4, we consider the coordination issue among the two possible SPEs, and we
use the Pareto-dominance and risk-dominance criteria to go beyond this issue; section 5
concludes.
2 Basic Framework
We consider a two-country economy where capital is mobile and the two ﬁscal authorities
set capital taxes. The model is similar to the one proposed by Laussel and Le Breton
(1998) as these authors provide a rigorous analysis of the existence and the uniqueness
of a Nash equilibrium in a tax competition game inspired from Wildasin (1988). Our
main results (Propositions 1 and 2) are based on the strategic complementarity of tax
strategies, or in other terms on the supermodularity of the tax competition game.
2.1 The model
The two jurisdictions, or countries, are denoted by A and B. A single homogeneous
private good is produced locally. This good can either be consumed or used as an input
into the provision of the local public good. The production function used in Country i,
denoted by e Fi (Ki,L i),w h e r eKi is the amount of mobile production factor (capital) and
Li the amount of ﬁxed production factor (labor or land), is supposed to be homogenous of
degree 1. Assuming an equal endowment in the ﬁxed factor for each country normalized
to 1: LA = LB =1 , the production function of private goods in Country i can be rewritten
as Fi (Ki). Following Laussel and Le Breton (1998), we assume the following properties
6on the function Fi (Ki):
F
0





i (0) > −∞,
F
000
i (.) ≥ 0. (1)
These assumptions ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
In contrast to Laussel and Le Breton (1998) who restrict themselves to the symmetric
case, we introduce some asymmetry among countries by considering diﬀerent production
functions (FA (.) 6= FB (.)). Several other formalizations of asymmetry are available in the
literature: Bucovetsky (1991) assumes that countries diﬀer by their size; Peralta and van
Ypersele (2005) consider diﬀerent individual capital endowments. However, the choice of
t h en a t u r eo fa s y m m e t r yw o u l dn o ta ﬀect our results, which are based on the property
of strategic complementarity of tax rates. In section 4, we establish a parallel between
the less productive country and the smaller country on the ground of the arguments of
capital elasticity or ex ante lowly endowed country.
Each country ﬁnances its public expenditure by means of a per unit tax on capital
at rate ti a n dap e ru n i tt a xo nl a b o ro rl a n d( aﬁxed production factor) at rate τi.
The availability of a non-distorting tax (τi) on an immobile factor which is supplied
inelastically, allows countries to optimally provide the public good (gi). We do not consider
the underprovision issue of the public good in order to focus exclusively on the nature of
competition and its impact on tax rates. The representative wage earner in Country i
may be described by the following utility function: Ui (xi,g i)=xi + gi,w h e r exi denotes
his consumption of private goods and corresponds to his net income.8 As Laussel and
Le Breton (1998) we assume that this net income derives from the ﬁxed factor only.
Thus, we have: xi = wi − τi,w h e r ewi denotes the earned wage, equal to the marginal
productivity of labor. The government budget is balanced: gi = τi +tiKi.W ed e ﬁne the
8Given the linearity and separability properties of the utility function, the public good plays no role
in the various optimization problems and is therefore left out of the analysis.
7welfare function of Country i as the sum Wi of the ﬁxed factor income and the capital
tax income:9
Wi (ti,t j)=Fi (Ki) − KiF
0
i (Ki)+tiKi. (2)
The capital is perfectly mobile between the jurisdictions and we assume an initial level





A (KA) − tA = F0
B (KB) − tB
KA + KB = K
(3)
In order to turn down the “pathological” case, where there is a continuum of Nash equi-
libria satisfying F0
i (Ki)−ti =0 , we assume that Fi (.) and K are such that the following
inequality holds:10






i (Ki) − ti > 0. (4)
This second condition means that the net capital return is strictly positive. Combined
with condition (1), it guarantees the uniqueness of the studied Nash equilibrium.















The stock of capital in Country i is decreasing in its tax rate (ti) and increasing in the
9This assumption which is also advanced by Hindriks, Peralta, and Weber (2008) is restrictive, since
it means that the capital owners are absent in the objective function of the government. However, Laussel
and Le Breton (1998) provide two possible interpretations of a such restriction, which are consistent with
Wildasin (1988): it can be justiﬁed as a partial equilibrium, or it corresponds to a political economy
view, focusing on the median voter. This second view is supposed to reﬂect the high concentration of
countries’ capital distribution.
10We thus restrict the equilibrium to be an interior solution. The case of capital net return equal to
zero is studied by Laussel and Le Breton (1998), p.292 sq.












Further, we can prove the following
Lemma 1 Under assumption (1), tax rates are strategic complements.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The explanation is simple: when government j increases its rate, it alleviates the
competitive pressure on governement i as this decision reduces the incentive of capital to
migrate from i to j. Therefore the marginal utility derived from an increase of the tax
rate set by governement i is increasing since it generates more revenues and ﬁnances more
additional public good. In other words, the second-order cross-derivatives of Wi (ti,t j)
are positive when ti is set optimally.
The strategic complementarity property of tax setting functions is crucial for our analy-
sis. Several recent works focusing on the estimation of the ﬁscal reaction functions in an
international or federal context support the view that ﬁscal interactions exist and high-
light positive slope reaction functions among countries or jurisdictions (see for instance
Revelli (2005), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008)).
In the following subsections, we will study three diﬀerent games, depending on the
sequence of the countries’ tax-setting. We denote GN t h eg a m ew h e r eb o t hc o u n t r i e s
choose simultaneously their tax rate; GA t h eg a m ew h e r eC o u n t r yA leads and Country B




At the simultaneous non-cooperative equilibrium each country chooses its own tax rate






the Nash equilibrium of this game. This pair must satisfy the following set of deﬁnitions:
11Since F00












WB (tA,t B),t A given.
Let us deﬁne the function Φi (ti,t j) by:
Φi (ti,t j)=ti + KiF
00
j (Kj),j 6= i. (7)







































Under assumption (1), Laussel and Le Breton (1998) establish the existence of the Nash
equilibrium. Condition (4) involves the uniqueness of this equilibrium by ruling out the
“pathological” case. In Appendix A.1,w es h o wt h a t
dtj
dti < 1, which means here that
the best-reply correspondences are contractions. This is another way to guarantee the
existence and the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (see Vives (1999), p. 47).
2.3 Stackelberg games GA and GB
There are two Stackelberg games depending on the identity of the leader. In the game Gi,
we assume that Country i “leads”, that is ﬁxes ﬁrst its tax rate, and Country j chooses





























10its own level tj.
Applying backward induction, we ﬁrst consider the maximization program of Country
j when it acts as the follower. It is given by:
t
F
j (ti) ≡ arg max
tj∈[0,1]
Wj (tj,t i)












































From the strategic complementarity of tax rates, we deduce that the second term of
equation (10) is negative. The ﬁrst term is positive. This property will allow us to rank
the equilibrium tax rates in the next subsection.
2.4 Comparison of the equilibrium tax rates
We show that these equilibria generate diﬀerent solutions and the tax rates obtained in
a game with leadership are higher than the rates obtained in the Nash game, when the
two authorities play simultaneously. This comes from the fact that tax rates are strategic
complements: an increase in the rate ﬁxed by the other government leads a government
to increase its own rate.
Given the property of strategic complementarity, we are able to rank the equilibrium
11tax rates.13
Lemma 2 For non identical countries, Nash tax rates are always lower than the tax rates










































Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Consistent with the strategic complementarity property and the existence of positive
externalities, tax rates in any Stackelberg equilibrium are higher than the rates obtained
a tt h eN a s he q u i l i b r i u m .W h e nt h el e a d e r ,s a yA, increases its tax rate relative to the
Nash equilibrium value, it induces the follower, B, to increase its own tax rate because
of the strategic complementarity property. In turn, this increases the leader’s payoﬀ be-
cause of the positive externality induced by tax decision, and captured by the sign of




B. In other words, the presence of
a leader in the tax competition race mitigates the “downward pressure” feature obtained
in the Nash equilibrium.14
If the two countries are identical (same production function), the ranking implies that
that the leader taxes more than the follower, as it is more able to resist the downward
pressure on tax rates. If the two countries are suﬃciently similar (close productivity
schedules), they adopt similar behaviors if leading. By a continuity argument, the same















14See Graph 1 in Appendix B.1 for an illustration in the case of quadratic production functions.
12However if the two countries are suﬃcient dissimilar in terms of production perfor-




B.F o ras u ﬃcient degree of
asymmetry in the production functions, the interaction eﬀects are much stronger from B
to A,t h a nf r o mA to B.T h e ntL
A is very close to tN
A and tL
B is very far from tN
B as well as
tF
A from tN
A. Therefore we get the two other possible rankings.
This explains the obtained possible rankings. Remark then that no combination of





3 Identifying the leader in the tax competition race.
These results imply that the existence and identity of a leader matter a lot in the tax
competition race. Hence we would like to know the identity of the leader if it exists: is
it Country A or B? To answer this question, we turn to the endogenization of moves,
using a timing game. In the ﬁrst stage of the timing game, the two players, here the
two authorities of the jurisdictions, decide on their preferred role. They may decide they
want to play “Early” or “Late”. Depending on the outcome of this stage, one of the three
games described above is selected and processed. Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)
and Amir and Stepanova (2006) we study the Subgame Perfect Equilibria of this timing
game. First, we highlight the presence of a second-mover advantage. This allows us to
deduce the Subgame Perfect Equilibria.
3.1 Second-mover advantage
We deﬁne the notions of “ﬁrst-” and “second-mover advantage” as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Country i has a ﬁrst (second)-mover advantage if its equilibrium payoﬀ in
the Stackelberg Game in which it leads (follows) is higher than in the Stackelberg Game
in which it follows (leads).
Using this deﬁnition, we establish the following Proposition:
13Proposition 1 At least one country has a second-mover advantage in the tax competition
race.




i for both countries, there is a second-mover advantage for both







,w h e nC o u n t r yj sets tL
j , it attracts more capital. Moreover, since
tF
j <t L
j , it beneﬁts as a follower (rather than a leader) from the higher tax rate set by
Country j acting as a leader, which reorients capital towards the follower. In case of







j ,o n l yC o u n t r yi prefers to follow, as the previous reasoning applies only
to this country.
3.2 A Timing Game
In order to address the existence and identity of a leader, we shall endogenize the sequence
of moves by resorting to a timing game, following the seminal study of Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990).
This game, which we denote by e G,i sd e ﬁned as follows. At the ﬁrst or “preplay” stage,
players simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to move “early” or “late”.
The players’ commitment to this choice is perfect. The timing choice of each player is
announced at the end of the ﬁrst stage. The second stage corresponds to the relevant
tax competition game studied in the previous section, which is deduced from the timing
decision at the ﬁrst stage: the game
¡
GN¢




if Country A chooses to move early (strategy Early) while




chooses to move early (strategy Early) while Country A chooses to move late (strategy
15When the two countries are identical, that is when Fi (K)=Fj (K), it is immediate to derive from
the previous Lemma the comparison between the tax rates under this assumption: tN <t F <t L.












































From the preceding normal form of the game e G, we obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 (i) The Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) of the timing game are the
Stackelberg Equilibria.
(ii) Moving sequentially instead of simultaneously is Pareto-improving for both countries.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Since tax rates are strategic complements, there are two possible Stackelberg equilibria
corresponding to the timing game e G. This comes from the fact that in any case, both the
ﬁrst- and second-movers are better oﬀ than under a Nash equilibrium: tax externalities
are always positive and at the SPEs, the tax rates are in both countries superior to those
established at the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, i.e. in the standard tax competition
game (Lemma 2).17




i ). The “downward pressure” is weaker than predicted in the standard
tax competition model since tax rates are always higher in the sequential games: both
16An other option exists in the literature on endogenous timing when both players choose to lead.
Indeed, Dowrick (1986) and more recently van Damme and Hurkens (1999) consider a Stackelberg warfare,
where both countries would choose their strategy as leader. In contrast, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)
or Amir and Stepanova (2006) apprehend this situation as the static Nash game. Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990) emphasize that Stackelberg warfare can occur only through error, since the underlying strategy of
one player is not consistent with the other player’s strategy.
17Notice that the equilibria studied in the literature on tax competition is not commitment robust.
Extending the approach of Rosenthal (1991), van Damme and Hurkens (1996) establish that a Nash
Equilibrium is commitment robust if and only if no player has a ﬁrst-mover incentive, that is no player
prefers to lead than to play the simultaneous game. In Appendix A.2, we highlight that both countries
always have a ﬁrst-mover incentive.
15countries have a common interest in avoiding the Nash tax rates, and they can do so by
resorting to non-synchronous moves, that is by accepting that one of them leads the tax
competition race.
4 A coordination issue
A new issue appears due to the multiplicity of SPEs of e G: how to select one of the two
possible solutions? There is a coordination issue. To solve this issue, we can resort to
two criteria in order to rank the SPEs: the Pareto-dominance and the risk-dominance
criteria. By so doing, we follow the deductive selection principle, that is we assume that
players hold beliefs consistent with the selection criterion.18 Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
deﬁne the risk-dominance criterion as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium risk-dominates another equilibrium when the former is less
risky than the latter, that is the risk-dominant equilibrium is the one for which the product
of the deviation losses is the largest.
In our framework, equilibrium (Early,Late) (Country A leads, Country B follows)
risk-dominates equilibrium (Late,Early) if the former is associated with the larger prod-
uct of deviation losses, denoted by Π. More formally, the equilibrium (Early,Late)



































B . Then the threat of reverting to the Nash equilibrium when





B . In other words, Country A has more to lose in case of inconsistent choices.
18No attempt is made to explain how decision makers acquire these beliefs. This approach contrasts
with the inductive selection principle, which uses learning and evolutionary dynamics to predict the
selection of an equilibrium.
16This makes it more vulnerable to pressures from Country B than the converse. Knowing
this, Country B chooses “Late”a n t i c i p a t i n gt h a tC o u n t r yAw i l ln o tc h o o s e“ Late”a n d







As stressed by Amir and Stepanova (2006), a resolution for risk-dominance does not
appear possible without using a precise speciﬁcation of the problem.19 To apply this
criterion to the tax competition problem, we consider a quadratic production function,
already used in the relevant literature:20
Fi (K)=( a − biK)K. (12)
Ex ante (before the tax competition game starts), both countries are endowed with the
same amount of capital (K/2). When bA >b B, ﬁrms in Country A are less productive
than in Country B. For a given pair of parameters (bA,b B), the tax rates and the capital
stocks at the equilibria of the three studied games are presented in the following table:































From the preceeding table, we can make several observations. First, if each region has
the same capital endowment before tax competition occurs, we observe that no country
exports capital at the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, while the leading country is always
19Analysing the competition among ﬁrms, these authors use a linear demand function as van Damme
and Hurkens (1999).
20See for instance, Bucovetsky (1991), Grazzini and van Ypersele (2003), Peralta and van Ypersele
(2005), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008).
17a capital exporter. Second, at the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, the less productive
country has the lower tax rate: bA >b B ⇔ tN
A <t N
B. This point results from the diﬀerence










¯ ¯ ¯ =
bA
bA+bB.S i n c e
Country A, being less productive, has a higher elasticity on capital in absolute value, it is
more sensitive to capital mobility and thus is led to tax less. Here we echo the analysis of
Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) who establish that small jurisdictions21 tend to set
lower tax rates than large ones. On the basis of capital elasticity, we can draw a parallel
between size and productivity, when we consider that the smaller country corresponds to
the less productive one, which we also call the ex ante lowly endowed country.
Given the deﬁnition (11) of risk-dominance, we obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 (i) The SPE, where the less productive country leads, risk-dominates the
other equilibrium.
(ii) If the asymmetry between countries is suﬃcient, the safer SPE becomes Pareto-
dominant.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
This proposition implies that Country A is always selected as the leader, according
to the risk-dominance criterion as long as bA >b B.22 Let us deﬁne γ as the degree of
asymmetry among the two countries: γ = bB/bA (γ<1 means that Country A is the less
productive). When the diﬀerence in productivity is suﬃciently pronounced (γ<γ 1 ' 0.25
or γ>γ 2 ' 4, see Appendix A.5.3), one country has a ﬁrst-mover advantage, while the
other still has a second-mover advantage. The risk-dominant equilibrium becomes Pareto-
21Small jurisdictions or countries may be considered as ex ante lowly endowed, since their size in
population explains directly their initial stock of capital under the assumption that each inhabitant has
the same individual endowment in capital.
22This result is a straight criticism of the assumption made by Wang (1999) or Baldwin and Krugman
(2004) that the larger country or the core country behaves as a leader.
18dominant. The following table summarizes the results of the preceeding Proposition:23
Table 2: Risk and Pareto dominance



























Pareto-dominance (Early,Late) none none (Late,Early)
Risk-dominance (Early,Late)( Early,Late)( Late,Early)( Late,Early)
At the safer SPE, the less productive country has to move early (A for γ<γ 1, B for
γ>γ 2) since it has more to lose in playing the simultaneous game than the other country.
For instance, if γ<γ 1,C o u n t r yA increases its own tax rate compared to the Nash level,
which will trigger a larger increase in Country B tax rate because of the complementarity
eﬀect; on the other hand, if B is a leader (Early),g i v e nt h a tA as a follower (Late) will
not tend to act much, the gain of B as a leader with respect to the Nash solution, is not
that large.
When the asymmetry is suﬃcient (γ<γ 1 or γ>γ 2), the SPE where the less pro-
ductive country leads, becomes Pareto-superior to the other SPE. Indeed, for low values
of bB with respect to bA (γ<γ 1), the less productive country (namely A) experiments
a ﬁrst-mover advantage, while the other has a second-mover advantage. By leading and






,C o u n t r yA encourages Country B to increase its tax
rate since we have tF
B >t L
B.24 Thus, Pareto-dominance reinforces risk-dominance when
countries’ asymmetry is suﬃcient.
Finally, our analysis invites to reconsider the “big-country-higher-tax-rate” rule, which
was emphasized ﬁrst by Bucovetsky (1991).25 Indeed, while at the simultaneous Nash
equilibrium, the more productive, or equivalently, the larger country always sets a higher
23See the Appendix A.5 for a justiﬁcation of the necessary condition: b<3/4 and the deﬁnition of
γk. A graphical illustration of these results is provided in the Appendix (Graph 4).
24From Table 1,w eh a v etF
B >t L
B for γ<e γ,w h e r ee γ is solution of 1 − 4γ2 − 2γ3 =0 , e γ ≈ 0.451606.
25In an asymmetric model of international trade Raimondos-Møller and Woodland (2000) also establish
the existence of situations in which the small country leads, ﬁxing its tariﬀ rate ﬁrst and yielding to
improve the welfare of both countries.
19tax rate due to its relatively low elasticity of capital to the tax rate, it may set the lower
tax rate at the safer SPE. More formally, for 1 >γ>
√
5−1
2 ,w eo b t a i ntL
A >t F
B.26 The less
productive (equivalently, the smaller) country may tax at a higher rate than the other
country. In other terms, the ex ante advantage (in productivity or in size) enjoyed by one
country allows it to reap the second-mover advantage.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Our analysis revisits tax competition by relaxing one implicit assumption generally made
in the relevant literature: the simultaneity of decisions on tax rates. Inspired by several
works in Industrial Organization, we developed a model where the timing of move, i.e.
the tax-setting, is endogenous. Our main results hold for any form of the government’s
objective function as long as tax rates are strategic complements. We established that:
the tax rates are higher when countries move sequentially than when they move simulta-
neously; at least one country experiments a second mover-advantage; moving sequentially
is Pareto- improving; the SPEs correspond to the two Stackelberg situations yielding to a
coordination issue. By specifying quadratic production functions, we solve it by applying
the notions of Pareto and risk dominance. At the safer SPE, the ex ante well endowed
country follows, reinforcing its ex ante advantage through the second-mover advantage.
When countries’ asymmetry is suﬃcient, Pareto-dominance conﬁrms risk-dominance in
selecting the same SPE.
In addition to the empirical studies which would explicitly consider the dynamics of
tax-setting decisions,27 further research could be considered. An immediate development











¯ ¯ ¯ =1 .
27Very few empirical studies have considered the order of tax-setting: Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002)
established that European countries follow the United States when they set their tax rate; focusing on
European countries only, Redoano (2007) show that large countries behave as leader. We established an
inverse sequence of tax decisions at the safer equilibrium. This contradiction invites to further empirical
and theoretical developments.
20is to introduce the capital owners in the welfare function. New conditions for existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium would be needed so as to ensure that tax rates be
strategic complements and the analysis developped above applied.28 An other development
would be to to consider the issue of underprovision of public goods when the timing of
moves is endogenized.
References
Altshuler, R., and T. J. Goodspeed (2002): “Follow the leader? Evidence on
European and U.S. tax competition,” Departmental Working Papers 200226, Rutgers
University, Department of Economics.
Amir, R., and A. Stepanova (2006): “Second-mover advantage and price leadership
in Bertrand duopoly,” Games and Economic Behavior, 55(1), 1—20.
Baldwin, R. E., and P. Krugman (2004): “Agglomeration, integration and tax har-
monisation,” European Economic Review, 48(1), 1—23.
Bayindir-Upmann, T., and A. Ziad (2005): “Existence of equilibria in a basic tax-
competition model,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 35(1), 1—22.
Bucovetsky, S. (1991): “Asymmetric tax competition,” Journal of Urban Economics,
30(2), 167—181.
Bulow, J. I., J. D. Geanakoplos, and P. D. Klemperer (1985): “Multimarket
oligopoly: strategic substitutes and complements,” Journal of Political Economy,9 3 ( 3 ) ,
488—511.
d’Aspremont, C., and L.-A. Gerard-Varet (1980): “Stackelberg-solvable games
and pre-play communication,” Journal of Economic Theory, 23(2), 201—217.
28See footnote (3) on the issue of the existence of Nash equilibrium in tax competition models.
21Devereux, M., B. Lockwood, and M. Redoano (2008): “Do countries compete
over corporate tax rates?,” Journal of Public Economics, 93(5-6), 1210—1235.
Dowrick, S. (1986): “Von Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly: choosing roles,” Rand
Journal of Economics, 17(2), 251—260.
Gal-Or, E. (1985): “First mover and second mover advantages,” International Economic
Review, 26(3), 649—653.
Gordon, R. H. (1992): “Can capital income taxes survive in open economies?,” Journal
of Finance, 47(3), 1159—80.
Grazzini, L., and T. van Ypersele (2003): “Fiscal coordination and political com-
petition,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5(2), 305—325.
Hamilton, J. H., and S. M. Slutsky (1990): “Endogenous timing in duopoly games:
Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2(1), 29—46.
Harsanyi, J. C., and R. Selten (1988): A general theory of equilibrium selection in
games. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hindriks, J., S. Peralta, and S. Weber (2008): “Competing in taxes and investment
under ﬁscal equalization,” Journal of Public Economics, 92(12), 2392—2402.
Kanbur, R., and M. Keen (1993): “Jeux sans frontieres: tax competition and tax
coordination when countries diﬀer in size,” American Economic Review, 83(4), 877—92.
Kempf, H., and G. Rota-Graziosi (2010): “Leadership in public good provision: a
timing game perspective,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12(4), 763—87.
Laussel, D., and M. Le Breton (1998): “Existence of Nash equilibria in ﬁscal com-
petition models,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 28(3), 283—296.
Peralta, S., and T. van Ypersele (2005): “Factor endowments and welfare levels in
an asymmetric tax competition game,” Journal of Urban Economics, 57(2), 258—274.
22Petchey, J. D., and P. Shapiro (2009): “Equilibrium in ﬁscal competition games
from the point of view of the dual,” Regional Science and Urban Economics,3 9 ( 1 ) ,
97—108.
Raimondos-Møller, P., and A. D. Woodland (2000): “Tariﬀ strategies and small
open economies,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 33(1), 25—40.
Redoano, M. (2007): “Fiscal interactions among European countries. Does the EU
matter?,” CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No., CESifo GmbH.
Revelli, F. (2005): “On spatial public ﬁnance empirics,” International Tax and Public
Finance, 12(4), 475—492.
Rosenthal, R. W. (1991): “A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commit-
ment opportunities,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3(2), 237—243.
Rothstein, P. (2007): “Discontinuous payoﬀs, shared resources, and games of ﬁscal
competition: existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium,” Journal of Public Economic
Theory, 9(2), 335—368.
Schelling, T. (1960): The strategy of conﬂict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Syropoulos, C. (1994): “Endogenous timing in games of commercial policy,” Canadian
Journal of Economics, 27(4), 847—64.
van Damme, E., and S. Hurkens (1996): “Commitment robust equilibria and endoge-
nous timing,” Games and Economic Behavior, 15(2), 290—311.
(1999): “Endogenous Stackelberg leadership,” Games and Economic Behavior,
28(1), 105—129.
(2004): “Endogenous price leadership,” Games and Economic Behavior,4 7 ( 2 ) ,
404—420.
23Vives, X. (1999): Olipoly pricing. Old ideas and new tools.T h eM I TP r e s s ,C a m b r i d g e ,
Massachusetts.
Wang, Y.-Q. (1999): “Commodity taxes under ﬁscal competition: Stackelberg equilib-
rium and optimality,” American Economic Review, 89(4), 974—981.
Wellisch, D. (2000): The theory of public ﬁnance in a federal state. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, New York.
Wildasin, D. E. (1988): “Nash equilibria in models of ﬁscal competition,” Journal of
Public Economics, 35(2), 229—240.
(1991): “Some rudimetary ’duopolity’ theory,” Regional Science and Urban Eco-
nomics, 21(3), 393—421.
Wilson, J. D. (1986): “A theory of interregional tax competition,” Journal of Urban
Economics, 19(3), 296—315.
(1991): “Tax competition with interregional diﬀerences in factor endowments,”
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 21(3), 423—451.
(1999): “Theories of tax competition,” National Tax Journal, 52(2), 269—304.
Wilson, J. D., and D. E. Wildasin (2004): “Capital tax competition: bane or boon,”
Journal of Public Economics, 88(6), 1065—1091.
Zodrow, G. R., and P. Mieszkowski (1986): “Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and
the underprovision of local public goods,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3), 356—370.
24A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1: strategic complementarity of the tax
rates
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where the function Φi (ti,t j) is deﬁned by:
Φi (ti,t j)=ti + KiF00











































A.2 Proof of Lemma 2: ranking of the equilibrium tax rates








































j by deﬁnition of the follower’s maximisation program. Inequality (13) involves that
each country has a ﬁrst-mover incentive.













































which contradicts (13). Thus we always have:
tF
i >t N
i ,i = A,B. (14)
Since ∂Ki
∂ti < 0 and dti























∂tj < 0 <
∂Φi(ti,tj)
∂ti , the inequalities (14) and (15) involve that we always have
tL
i >t N
i ,i = A,B. (16)











Hence, we have three possible rankings for the tax rates: ∀(i,j) ∈ {A,B}




















For identical countries, we have: tL
A = tL












= tF and tN
A = tN
B = tN.W eo b t a i n
one possible ranking only:
tN <t F <t L.
¤
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1: second-mover advantage
• When ∀i = A,B, tN
i <t F
i <t L




















where the ﬁrst inequality results from the deﬁnition of the Stackelberg equilibrium when Country i
































by similar reasoning. Country i has a second-mover advantage.¤
26A.4 Proof of Proposition 2: Subgame Perfect Equilibria































where the ﬁrst inequality results from the deﬁnition of the Stackelberg equilibrium when Country i follows,
and the second from the facts that tL
i >t N
i and ∂Wi (ti,t j)/∂tj > 0. Thus, there are two SPEs which
correspond to the two Stackelberg situations.
(ii) Immediate given the above inequalities.¤
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3: Risk and Pareto-dominance with a
quadratic production function
A.5.1 Restrictions on the parameters’ values (a, bA, bB and K)
The assumption of a not negative net return of capital given in (4) and the nature of tax rates, which
must belong to the interval [0,1] induce some restrictions on the parameters’ values (respectively a, bA,





M o r e o v e r ,w ea s s u m et h a ta =1 , bA = b and bB = γbA,w i t hγ>0. We obtain the following restrictions,













We may reduce these preceding restrictions to a suﬃcient condition on b,t h a ti s :
b<3/4. (19)
A.5.2 Risk-dominance
The deviations product is then:
Π(b,γ)=b2 (1 + γ)(1− γ)Q(γ),
where
Q(γ)=
14 + 78γ + 180γ2 + 231γ3 +1 8 0 γ4 +7 8 γ5+1 4 γ6
2(6+13γ +6 γ2)
3 .
Since Q(γ) > 0 for any γ respecting and , we deduce that: sign{Π(b,γ)} = sign{1 − γ}.W eo b t a i n :
If γ<1,
(A moves Late, B moves Early) Risk-dominates (A moves Early, B moves Late).
If γ>1,
(A moves Early, B moves Late) Risk-dominates (A moves Late, B moves Early).
30These results are computed with Mathematica Software. The program is avalaible upon request.
27A.5.3 Pareto-dominance





−1+γ2 (1 + γ)(11+7γ)
(3 + 2γ)(2+3γ)




7+1 8 γ +1 1 γ2 − γ4
(3 + 2γ)
2 (2 + 3γ)
b>0 if and only if γ>γ 2 ≈ 3.99331.
If γ<γ 1,
(A moves Late, B moves Early) Pareto-dominates (A moves Early, B moves Late).
If γ>γ 2,
(A moves Early, B moves Late) Pareto-dominates (A moves Late, B moves Early).
¤
28BG r a p h s
B.1 Graph 1: Reactions functions
The following graphs present the reaction functions in the case of quadratic production functions with
a normalized worldwide capital (K =1 ). These reaction functions are denoted tF
i (tj),s i n c et h e ya r e
established with the follower’s maximization program, but correspond also to the simultaneous Nash








































































Graph 3: K =1 , bA =0 ,6 and bB =0 ,2.
B.2 Graph 2: Pareto and Risk-dominance









Graph 4: Pareto and risk dominance, with b =0 ,5.
30Documents de Travail 
 
 
280.  D. Durant et L. Frey, “Une Première comparaison des droits à pension des ménages français et américains,” Avril 2010 
 
281.  G. Bertola, A. Dabusinskas, M. Hoeberichts, M. Izquierdo, C. Kwapil, J. Montornès and D. Radowski, “Price, Wage and 
Employment Response to Shocks: Evidence from the WDN Survey,” May 2010 
 
282.  J. Montornès and J-B. Sauner-Leroy, “Wage-setting Behavior in France: Additional Evidence from an Ad-hoc Survey,” May 
2010 
 
283.  R. Bourlès, G. Cette, J. Lopez, J. Mairesse and G. Nicoletti, “Do product market regulations in upstream sectors curb 
productivity growth? Panel data evidence for OECD countries,” June 2010 
 
284.  Ph. Askenazy, Th. Breda and D. Irac, “Innovation and Advertising: Theory and Evidence,” May 2010 
 
285.  M. Lemoine and C. Mougin, “The Growth-Volatility Relationship: New Evidence Based on Stochastic Volatility in Mean 
Models,” July 2010 
 
286.  C. Bouthevillain and G. Dufrénot, “Are the effects of fiscal changes different in times of crisis and non-crisis? The French 
Case,” July 2010 
 
287.  S. Avouyi-Dovi, D. Fougère and E. Gautier, “Wage rigidity, collective bargaining and the minimum wage: evidence from 
french agreement data,” July 2010 
 
288.  P. Askenazy, C. Célérier et D. Irac, “Vente à distance, internet et dynamiques des prix,” juillet 2010 
 
289.  G. Dufrénot, P. Frouté and C. Schalck, “The French Regions’ Borrowing Behaviours,” july 2010 
 
290.  C. Bordes and L. Clerc, “The ECB art of central banking and the separation principle,” August 2010 
 
291.  R. Jimborean and J-S. Mésonnier, “Banks' financial conditions and the transmission of monetary policy: a FAVAR approach,” 
September 2010 
 
292.  G. Dufrénot and L. Paul, “Fiscal development in the euro aera beyond the crisis: some lessons drawn from fiscal reaction 
functions,” October 2010 
 
293.  R. Cooper, H. Kempf and D. Peled, “Insulation impossible: monetary policy and regional fiscal spillovers in a federation,” 
October 2010 
 
294.  C. Célérier, “Compensation in the financial sector: are all bankers superstars?,” October 2010 
 
295.  O. de Bandt and S. Malik, “Is there evidence of shift-contagion in international housing markets?,” October 2010 
 
296.  F. Ferroni, “Did Tax Policies mitigate US Business Cycles?,” October 2010 
 
297.  E. Challe and X. Rago, “Fiscal policy in a tractable liquidity-constrained economy,” October 2010 
 
298.  P. Cahuc and E. Challe, “Produce or speculate? Asset bubbles, occupational choice and efficiency,” October 2010 
 




Pour accéder à la liste complète des Documents de Travail publiés par la Banque de France veuillez consulter le site :  
http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/publications/documents_de_travail/documents_de_travail_10.htm 
 
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the Banque de France, please visit the website: 
http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/publications/documents_de_travail/documents_de_travail_10.htm 
 
Pour tous commentaires ou demandes sur les Documents de Travail, contacter la bibliothèque de la Direction Générale des Études et des 
Relations Internationales à l'adresse suivante : 
 
For any comment or enquiries on the Working Papers, contact the library of the Directorate General Economics and International 
Relations at the following address : 
 
    BANQUE DE FRANCE 
    49- 1404  Labolog 
    75049 Paris Cedex 01 
    tél : 0033 (0)1 42 97 77 24 ou 01 42 92 62 65 ou 48 90 ou 69 81 
   email  :  marie-christine.petit-djemad@banque-france.fr 
     jeannine.agoutin@banque-france.fr 
     michael.brassart@banque-france.fr 
     veronique.jan-antuoro@banque-france.fr 
     nathalie.bataille-salle@banque-france.f 